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Highlights 
• The modified-ICPS operationalises the ICPS for use as a human factors taxonomy. 
• The mICPS can identify sequences of incidents and contributing factors leading to 
adverse events. 
• The mICPS can be used to highlight where preventive approaches should be 
targeted. 
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Using the WHO International Classification of Patient Safety Framework to identify 
incident characteristics and contributing factors for medical or surgical complication 
deaths 
 
Abstract 
This study aimed to operationalise and use the World Health Orga izatio s International 
Classification for Patient Safety (ICPS) to identify incident characteristics and contributing 
factors of deaths involving complications of medical or surgical care in Australia. A sample of 
500 coronial findings related to patient deaths following complications of surgical or medical 
care in Australia were reviewed using a modified-ICPS (mICPS).  Over two-thirds (69.0%) of 
incidents occurred during treatment and 27.4% occurred in the operating theatre. Clinical 
process and procedures (55.9%), medication/IV fluids (11.2%) and healthcare-associated 
infection/complications (10.4%) were the most common incident types. Coroners made 
recommendations in 44.0% of deaths and organisations undertook preventive actions in 
40.0% of deaths. This study demonstrated that the ICPS was able to be modified for 
practical use as a human factors taxonomy to identify sequences of incident types and 
contributing factors for patient deaths. Further testing of the mICPS is warranted. 
 
Keywords:  patient safety, taxonomy, error 
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1. Introduction 
Investigating the factors that contributed to an event resulting in an unexpected patient 
death in hospital can aid in preventing and improving the quality of healthcare (Gill et al. 
2006, Ibrahim et al. 2009).  Prevention of adverse events (i.e. incidents which result in harm 
to patients (Runciman et al. 2009)) requires good quality information on how and why these 
events occur.  Examining factors that contributed to an adverse event can involve a review 
through healthcare governance systems, such as root cause analyses (Percarpio et al. 2008, 
Nicolini et al. 2011) or morbidity and mortality meetings . 
 
In Australia, if the death of a patient occurred as a result of a complication during a health-
related procedure, it should be reported to a Coroner.  Each Australian state and territory 
has its own Coronial Act and, in general, a death is legislated to be reportable to a Coroner if 
the death was not a reasonably expected outcome of a health-related procedure (i.e. 
medical, surgical or dental procedures, including the administration of an anaesthetic, 
sedative or other drug) (NSW Government 1980). Coroners are judicial magistrates whose 
main role is to establish the de eased s identity, cause of death, how the death occurred, 
and whether it could have been prevented (NSW Coroner's Court 2018). Coronial findings 
can provide an event narrative and a rich source of information to examine the 
circumstances of death (Hanzlick and Parrish 1996, Pudney and Grech 2016). Narrative text 
has previously been used to classify factors contributing to patient deaths using a human 
factors taxonomy (Mitchell et al. 2016).  Identifying the human factors contribution to 
adverse patient safety events involves examining the interrelationships between healthcare 
providers, patients, the health organisation, the type of, and use of, technology, equipment 
and tools, the organisation of work, and the workplace, including both the physical and 
social environment (Holden et al. 2013, Carayon et al. 2014). 
 
Human factors taxonomies have been used in healthcare to aid in identifying the factors 
contributing to adverse events and to identify priorities for preventive activities (Chang et 
al. 2005, Woloshynowych et al. 2005, ElBardissi et al. 2007, World Health Organization 2009, 
Mitchell et al. 2014, Carson-Stevens et al. 2016, Mitchell et al. 2016).  A human factors 
taxonomy should include a formal structure for the classification of concepts, with each 
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concept or factor clearly defined.  A data dictionary usually accompanies a taxonomy to 
provide coding frames for each concept that includes example application of the definitions.  
The human factors taxonomies that have been used in healthcare have largely been 
developed by independent teams and each has defined concepts differently and collected 
information on different types of concepts contributing to adverse patient safety events 
(Mitchell et al. 2014).  Existing taxonomies have been lacking, as some taxonomies only 
include task and organisational factors and do not consider cognitive errors (Chang 2007, 
Itoh et al. 2007), while some taxonomies only considered cognitive errors (Henneman et al. 
2010).  Other taxonomies do not include patient-related factors (Hicks et al. 2008, 
Kantelhardt et al. 2011), only one has considered the sequence of causal factors leading to 
the adverse event (Mitchell et al. 2016), and for some taxonomies inter-rater reliability was 
not assessed during development (Chang 2007, Benavidez et al. 2008, Cagliano et al. 2011). 
Internationally, there are heartening efforts to develop taxonomies for care contexts with a 
paucity of research and development such as primary care dentistry (Ensaldo-Carrasco et al. 
in-press, 2019).  
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) Conceptual Framework for the International 
Classification for Patient Safety (ICPS) was developed to work towards a common 
understanding of patient safety concepts and terminology (World Health Organization 
2009).  While the ICPS provides an informational framework, the framework needs 
adaptation and the concepts defined to make it suitable for use as a human factors 
taxonomy (Runciman et al. 2009, Schulz et al. 2009, World Alliance For Patient Safety 
Drafting Group et al. 2009).  The relationships and links between the ICPS sub-categories are 
not clearly defined (Schulz et al. 2009) and some categories are not mutually exclusive. 
McElroy and colleagues (McElroy et al. 2016) adapted the ICPS to identify contributing 
factors (CFs) to adverse events involving adult liver and kidney transplant surgeries, but the 
ICPS has not yet been operationalised to identify factors contributing to patient deaths 
following medical or surgical complications.  This study aims to operationalise and use the 
ICPS to identify incident characteristics and CFs of deaths involving complications of medical 
or surgical care. 
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2. Material and methods 
A retrospective examination of a random sample of 500 coronial findings related to patient 
deaths following complications of surgical or medical care from the Australian National 
Coronial Information System (NCIS) was conducted.  Ethical approval was obtained from the 
Macquarie University Human Research Ethics Committee (reference no: 5201500660), the 
Victorian State Government Justice Human Research Ethics Committee (CF/15/16426), and 
the Western Australia Coronial Ethics Committee (EC16/2015). 
 
2.1 Data collection 
The NCIS is a national internet-based data storage and retrieval system for deaths reported 
to a Coroner.  The NCIS contains information regarding the cause and circumstances of 
death, as well as demographic information on the deceased. Accompanying their coronial 
findings, a Coroner may make recommendations aimed at improving safety and these 
determinations are also available, and where facilities have already implemented preventive 
actions prior to the coronial inquest, these activities may also be recorded in the coronial 
finding. 
 
2.2 Identification of medical or surgical care deaths 
All deaths resulting from complications of surgical or medical care for individuals of any age 
from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2013 were identified using the NCIS intent at case 
o pletio  lassifi atio  of o pli atio s of edi al or surgi al are  NCI“: 6  AND/O‘ ia 
the i te t at otifi atio  of o pli atio s of edi al or surgi al are  NCI“: 6  AND/O‘ ia 
e ha is  of i jur  o pli atio s of health are  NCIS: 20 to 20.99) AND/OR through ICD-
10: Y40-Y84, complications of surgical and medical care and the death occurred in a 
hospital. 
 
Of the 3,227 deaths identified following complications of surgical or medical care, 2,137 
(66.2%) had a coronial finding and summary of events leading to the death attached to the 
mortality record in the NCIS.  There ere o sig ifi a t differe es  se  χ²= .  df= , p 
=0.3) for deaths that had a coronial finding present or not.  However, there was a significant 
differe e  age group χ²= .  df= , p< . , ith all hildre  <  ear of age ha i g a 
coronial finding present. Of the 2,137, a random sample of 500 coronial findings that had a 
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coronial finding attached in the NCIS were identified for review. A simple random sample 
was selected using PROC SURVEYSELECT in SAS.   Patient demographic information was 
obtained from the NCIS coronial record. 
 
2.3 Adaption of the WHO International Classification for Patient Safety 
The ICPS was developed using a two-round modified-Delphi study with international patient 
safety experts (World Health Organization 2009). It contains ten high-level conceptual areas, 
of which six areas (i.e. patient characteristics, incident type, incident characteristics, CFs, 
actions to reduce risk, and ameliorating actions) were adapted for this study.  Three of the 
remaining four areas of the ICPS (i.e. detection, organisational outcomes, and patient 
outcomes) were either not able to be identified or not relevant for this study.  Information 
for the last area of the ICPS (i.e. patient characteristics) was collected through data recorded 
in the NCIS. 
 
Both the incident types and CFs sections from the original ICPS were re-configured into 
three-level hierarchical classification frameworks.  Each main incident type category was 
converted to represent Level 1 of the hierarchy, the process categories for each incident 
type were used to indicate Level 2, and the problem categories Level 3 of the incident type 
hierarchy.  Likewise, for the CFs section each main category represented Level 1, the sub-
categories were used to indicate Level 2, and the sub-sub categories used to indicate Level 3 
of the CFs hierarchy.  Each incident type and CF in the ICPS was defined and, where relevant, 
an example added (Mitchell and Faris 2018).  Where the incident type or the CFs were not 
mutually exclusive, they were either revised or removed. 
 
The ICPS phase of care categories were modified to indicate the patient s care phase at the 
time of the event. The location of the event within the healthcare setting was recorded 
using classifications adapted from Chang et al (Chang et al. 2005) and Webb et al (Webb et 
al. 1993).  Any coronial recommendations or any organisational preventive actions made by 
the hospital since the death were classified based on a modified version of the ICPS of 
a eliorati g a tio s  a d a tio s to redu e risk  categories. 
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Two authors (RM and MF) reorganised the sub-categories to classify the patient deaths and 
refined the ICPS taxonomy for practical use (Mitchell and Faris 2018).  The taxonomy was 
pilot-tested by two authors (MF and RM) using ten publicly available Australian coronial 
findings of patient deaths following complications of surgical or medical care. Pilot testing 
involved reading each coronial finding and then using the draft modified-ICPS (mICPS) to 
classify the incident types and the CFs.  Average percent agreement between the two coders 
(MF and RM) for incident types at Level 1 was 48%, at Level 2 was 38% and Level 3 was 30%.  
Percent agreement for CFs at Level 1 was 78%, at Level 2 was 60%, and Level 3 was 58%. 
Three medical science students were also involved in reviewing and providing feedback on 
the draft ICPS taxonomy to classify patient deaths.  Following pilot testing and review, 
further modifications were made to the taxonomy.  This included removal of confusing 
ter i olog , su h as ot perfor ed he  i di ated  to si pl  ot perfor ed , and 
including additional Level 3 categories for some factors to incorporate additional issues, 
such as delays/failure to respond. 
 
2.4 Data collection and coder training 
Data were recorded in a Microsoft Access database by coders, one with human factors 
training (RM).  Three coders were trained by MF and were given an overview of the mICPS, 
were provided with a data dictionary that included the taxonomy and definitions of each 
concept, and conducted two example classifications of patient deaths using the mICPS.  
Debriefing was conducted and where there were discrepancies between the coders during 
the training exercise and the trainer, the rationale for classifications for each event was 
discussed and consensus achieved. 
 
2.5 Inter-rater reliability 
Following training, inter-rater reliability was assessed between four coders (MF, RL, GN, DF) 
using the mICPS using coronial findings of ten patient deaths.  Pair-wise percent agreement 
was calculated for each pair of coders for each incident type and contributing factor level 
and then the average agreement for each incident type and contributing factor level was 
calculated. Average percent agreement between the coders for incident types at Level 1 was 
83% (range 71-92%), at Level 2 was 81% (range 75-88%) and Level 3 was 78% (range 71-
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83%).  Percent agreement for CFs at Level 1 was 69% (range 46-83%), at Level 2 was 62% 
(range 46-75%) and Level 3 was 58% (range 33-75%). 
 
2.6 Classification of coronial findings using the modified-ICPS 
The patie t s phase of are, lo atio  ithi  the hospital/health setting at the time of the 
event, up to four incident types, up to four CFs, up to five preventive actions as a result of 
the death made by the organisation, and up to five targets for coronial recommendations 
were classified.  An incident type as o sidered to e a  e e t or circu sta ce hich…led 
to unintended and/or unnecessary harm to a person… (Committee of Experts on 
Managment of Safety and Quality in Health Care 2005).  Each incident type must have 
played a role in causing the death to occur and was recorded sequentially as the incident(s) 
occurred.  For example, incident type 1 occurred closest to the death preceded by incident 
type 2, preceded by incident types 3 and 4, respectively.  The temporal sequence of incident 
t pes is ased o  ‘easo s “ iss Cheese Model of ausatio  (Reason 1997) and the Human 
Factors Classification Framework for Patient Safety (Mitchell et al. 2016). This structured 
approach for sensemaking following an adverse event, known as the Recursive Model for 
Incident Analysis (Carson-Stevens et al. 2016), has been widely used to characterise adverse 
events (Cooper et al. 2017, Rees et al. 2017). 
 
Each incident type was classified leading up to the patient death in a temporal sequential 
order.  CFs could have occurred at any stage in the temporal sequence (Figure 1).  A CF was 
o sidered to e a circumstance, action or influence which is thought to have played a part 
in the origin or development of an incident or to increase the risk of an incident  (World 
Health Organization 2007).  CFs ould i ol e a staff e er s eha iour or a tio s, the 
patient, the organisation (such as policies or guidelines, supervision), or the work 
environment (such as noise, remoteness).  The CFs were considered to be factors that pre-
existed before the sequence of incident types began (Mitchell et al. 2016). 
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2.7 Data management and analysis 
Information regarding patient deaths from the NCIS were combined with the mICPS data 
from the Access database. All descriptive statistics and 95% confidence intervals were 
calculated using SAS version 9.4 (SAS Institute 2014). 
 
3. Results 
Just over half the deaths were of females (53.8%) and the mean age was 54.3 years (SD 
28.0). Over two-thirds (69.0%) of adverse events occurred during treatment, 9.6% during 
assessment and 6.6% during pre-admission. The most common location of the event was 
the operating theatre (27.4% , ard/patie t s roo  .0%) or the emergency department 
(10.8%) (Table 1). 
 
All events had at least one incident type identified, 54.4% had at least two, 25.0% had three 
and 8.0% had four incident types identified. Clinical process and procedures (55.9%), 
medication/IV fluids (11.2%) and healthcare-associated infection/complications (10.4%) 
were the most common incident types identified across the sequence of events (Table 2). In 
the majority of events (82.0%) a least one CF could be identified, with 203 (40.6%) events 
having two, 96 (19.2%) events three, and 38 (7.6%) events four CFs identified.  There were 
756 CFs identified in total. CFs relating to healthcare staff (39.7%), the organisation/service 
(30.3%) or the patient (25.8%) were the most common (Table 3).  
 
Within clinical process and procedures, the most common type of events were those 
relating to procedures/treatment/interventions (29.0%). Common sequences of incident 
types for patients that experienced an adverse event during a 
procedure/treatment/intervention involved (i) diagnostic issues (12.2%) involving either a 
delay/failure to recognise a deteriorating patient (57.9% of the diagnostic issues), a 
complication (26.3%) or an incomplete diagnosis (15.8%) and (ii) treatment issues (12.2%) 
involving either a delay/failure to recognise a deteriorating patient (47.4% of the treatment 
issues), a complication (42.1%) or an incomplete/wrong process (10.5%) (Figure 2).  The 
most common CFs for adverse events involving procedures/treatment/interventions were 
staff factors (44.0%) (such as human error, miscommunication or inexperience), 
organisational/service factors (26.9%) (including guidelines not being followed, inconsistent 
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or no guidelines), patient factors (25.5%) (such as physical impairments or physical 
characteristics) and work environment factors (2.3%) (including remote/long distance). 
 
Sepsis (6.5%) was the most common outcome of healthcare-associated infection.  The most 
common sequences of incident types for patients that developed sepsis involved (i) 
treatment issues (31.5%) where there was a complication (58.8% of treatment issues), or 
there was a delay/failure to recognise a deteriorating patient (29.4%) or an other  type of 
incident (17.6%), (ii) diagnostic issues (20.4%) following a delay/failure to recognise a 
deteriorating patient (63.6% of diagnostic issues), or that were incomplete or not performed 
(27.3%) or involved the wrong process (9.1%), and (iii) medication issues (11.1%) that 
involved inappropriate medications (50.0% of medication issues), adverse patient reactions 
(33.3%) or omitted doses (16.7%) (Figure 3).  The most common types of CFs for sepsis were 
staff factors (33.8%) (such as human error, bias/anchoring or inadequate communication 
between staff), organisational/service factors (32.3%) (including guidelines not being 
followed, inconsistent or no guidelines, work pressure) and patient factors (29.2%) (such as 
physical impairments or physical characteristics). 
 
Coroners made recommendations in 220 (44.0%) deaths, with the most common involving 
changes to organisational policies/protocols/guidelines (33.2%), staff training/education 
(20.2%) and organisational record keeping (15.4%).  Preventive actions undertaken by the 
organisation were reported in 1 in 5 (40.0%) coronial findings and the most common were 
changes to organisational policies/protocols/guidelines (38.9%), staff education/training 
(20.4%), equipment changes (10.2%), and improvements in record keeping (9.2%) (Table 4). 
 
4. Discussion 
Human factors classification taxonomies can assist in identifying factors that contributed to 
adverse events and in identifying areas for preventive efforts (Simsekler et al. 2015).  This 
study trialed a method of examining coronial findings using a mICPS that went beyond 
esta lishi g a patie t s ause of death.  Coronial investigations can provide an opportunity 
to identify factors contributing to fatal events and by identifying sequences of incident types 
and CFs, this study has shown that the mICPS could be used to supplement the coronial 
investigative process. 
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This study identified similar causal sequences for patient deaths that were immediately 
preceded by an incident that either involved a procedure/treatment/intervention or 
resulted in sepsis.  During the diagnosis or treatment phase of care there were 
commonalities in the circumstances surrounding the fatal incidents where either healthcare 
staff did not recognise the patient was deteriorating and treatment was, therefore, delayed 
or there was a complication, such as a perforation during surgery, that was not immediately 
identified. Delays in recognising deteriorating patients and delayed identification of 
complications have been found to be associated with adverse events (Beaumont et al. 2008, 
Donaldson et al. 2014). Rapid response prevention programs, such as Between the Flags 
(Hughes et al. 2014), have been adopted by hospitals in an effort to trigger when patients 
are deteriorating and to escalate urgent patient review and rapid response. 
 
Complications following treatment were common sequences in the incident pathway for 
sepsis cases and for incidents involving a procedure/treatment/intervention, particularly 
during surgery which comprised over one-quarter of adverse events in the current study. 
Further examinations of incident type sequences and CFs for patient deaths by type of 
surgery could be instrumental in identifying where reductions in patient mortality could be 
made.  Gyomber et al (2006) analysed patient deaths associated with urological surgery and 
found that the majority of deaths were due to known surgical complications.  The authors 
were able to identify patient characteristics, such as coronary artery disease, and increased 
monitoring and response activities, including the need for closer cardiovascular monitoring, 
and the ability to transfer patients rapidly to a coronial care unit, as further steps that could 
be undertaken to reduce the incidence of known surgical complications and potentially 
patient deaths. This level of analysis was not often demonstrated in the coronial findings 
reviewed for the current study. 
 
Around one in ten sepsis cases had a medication issue identified in the temporal sequence 
of incident types, primarily involving the appropriateness of the medication prescribed, 
adverse reactions/contraindications or omitted doses.  Delayed identification that the 
patient had sepsis is likely to have contributed to patients being administered inappropriate 
medication (Carrigan et al. 2004, McNab et al. 2018). Prior studies of adverse events have 
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also identified medication issues involving the prescription of the wrong drug or incorrect 
dose (Amato et al. 2017), particularly for older adults (Cooper et al. 2017). 
 
While incident types and CFs could be identified for the majority of patient deaths in the 
current study, in some cases there was not enough detail available in the coronial findings 
to record the sequences of incident types leading to the death.  It is possible that, for some 
deaths, particularly those involving known procedural/surgical complications, there was a 
limited investigation surrounding the circumstances of the event.  In some cases, having an 
expert medical clinical team to provide assistance during the coronial process would be of 
benefit.  For example, in Victoria, Australia a clinical liaison service including physicians and 
nurses experienced in the public health prevention approach are available to provide advice 
to police assisting the Coroner (Ibrahim et al. 2009). 
 
Many of the investigations of adverse events result in recommendations being made to 
develop and/or improve guidelines, policies and procedures (Pudney and Grech 2016, 
Hibbert et al. 2018).  In the current study, around one-third of coronial recommendations 
involved changing organisational policies/protocols/guidelines and for one in five patient 
deaths the organisation had already made changes to policies/protocols/guidelines that 
were documented in the coronial finding.  The ongoing cycle of the development of policies 
and rules following adverse events attempts to ensure a reliable standard of patient care, 
but can create a more complex and brittle healthcare system (Cook and Woods 1994) and 
may not result in changes that lead to improvements in practice.  Future research should 
consider the effectiveness of simply developing or modifying hospital-based policies and 
guidelines, in conjunction with efforts to enhance organisation factors, such as workplace 
culture, to prevent adverse events for patients. 
 
There are several limitations of the current study.  The use of the mICPS for this study only 
examined patient deaths, so it is possible that further refinement of the mICPS could be 
required to examine other patient outcomes across a range of settings, including primary 
care (Cooper et al. 2018).  In terms of using coronial findings from the NCIS to examine the 
mICPS, for some deaths only limited information was available, limiting the ability to identify 
potential contributing factors. As there was a significant difference in the presence of a 
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coronial finding by age group, there was a greater likelihood that children <1 year of age 
were selected and included within this study.  However, children <1 year only accounted for 
10% of the random sample. The inclusion of a measure of the level of confidence by coders 
for their classifications could have provided a guide as to the certainty of the coder in their 
classification of incident types and contributing factors.  In addition, there is known 
underreporting of patient deaths to a Coroner (Charles et al. 2007, Lu et al. 2008). 
Therefore, representativeness of the sample is unknown. Nonetheless, structured reviews 
of reports describing unsafe care present opportunity to identify opportunities for future 
care improvement, as demonstrated in the United Kingdom for older adults and children in 
primary care (Cooper et al. 2017, Rees et al. 2017).  
 
Coronial investigations involve the most serious adverse events and, as they can provide in-
depth evidence on the circumstances surrounding the event, they allow insights into 
prevention not necessarily available from other sources.  This study was largely explorative 
in nature to determine if the mICPS could be used to describe adverse events, nevertheless, 
it was able to indicate a range of incident types and CFs for a sample of patient deaths.  This 
study also showed how different causal patterns identified using the mICPS play a role in 
different types of adverse events. If applied internationally, mICPS could support temporal 
and geographical comparisons of the identified causes of adverse events and could catalyse 
efforts to target and design solutions for improved safety in healthcare systems. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study operationalised the ICPS for practical use and field tested the mICPS as a human 
factors taxonomy.  While potential variability in coder classifications needs to be monitored, 
the mICPS enabled non-human factors trained coders to identify sequences of incident 
types and CFs for a sample of patient deaths.  The mICPS identified patterns of causation for 
patient deaths and highlights where preventive approaches should be targeted to tackling 
adverse events.  The mICPS should be tested further to enable inferences regarding the 
nature of adverse events to be made. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual model of the classification of mICPS incident types and contributing factors  
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Figure 2:  Sequences of incident types for patients who had a procedure/ treatment/ intervention 
incident type immediately prior to death (n=156) 
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Figure 3:  Sequences of incident types for patients who had contracted sepsis immediately prior to 
death (n=60) 
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Table 1: Demographic, care phase and incident location characteristics for patient deaths in 
Australia 
 Patient deaths 
(n=500) 
95% confidence 
interval 
 n %  
Gender    
Male 231 46.2 41.8-50.7 
Female 269 53.8 49.4-58.2 
Age group    
<1 years 50 10.0 7.5-13.0 
1-9 years 12 2.4 1.3-4.2 
10-19 years 19 3.8 2.3-5.9 
20-29 years 23 4.6 2.9-6.8 
30-39 years 40 8.0 5.8-10.7 
40-49 years 36 7.2 5.1-9.8 
50-59 years 50 10.0 7.5-13.0 
60-69 years 75 15.0 12.0-18.4 
70-79 years 94 18.8 15.5-22.5 
80+ years 101 20.2 16.8-24.0 
Care phase    
Pre-admission 33 6.6 4.6-8.8 
Care on admission 15 3.0 1.7-4.9 
Assessment 48 9.6 7.2-12.5 
Treatment 345 69.0 64.7-73.0 
Discharge 7 1.4 0.6-2.9 
Post-discharge 3 0.6 0.1-1.7 
Transfer of care 8 1.6 0.7-3.1 
In-patient resident 19 3.8 2.3-5.9 
Other 22 4.4 2.8-6.6 
Incident location    
Operating theatre 138 27.6 23.7-31.5 
Ge eral ard/ patie t’s roo  100 20.0 16.6-23.8 
Emergency department 54 10.8 8.2-13.9 
Intensive Care Unit 38 7.6 5.4-10.3 
Birthing suite, labour room 31 6.2 4.3-8.7 
Diagnostic procedures (e.g. CT or MRI scan, X-ray, imaging) 12 2.4 1.3-4.2 
Day procedure, treatment room 10 2.0 0.1-3.7 
Mental health, psychiatric unit 8 1.6 0.7-3.1 
Transfer between hospitals or units 8 1.6 0.7-3.1 
Outpatient clinic 7 1.4 0.6-2.9 
Neonatal or paediatric ICU 6 1.2 0.5-2.6 
High Dependence Unit 6 1.2 0.5-2.6 
Long-term acute care, hospice 4 0.8 0.2-2.0 
Coronary care or acute care unit 2 0.4 0.05-1.4 
Nursery 2 0.4 0.05-1.4 
Other 54 10.8 8.2-13.5 
Multiple 5 1.0 0.3-2.3 
Not known 15 3.0 1.7-4.9 
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Table 2: Level 1 and common Level 2 incident types 1 to 4 involved in the patient death 
 
Incident type Incident type1 
(n=500) 
Incident type2 
(n=272) 
Incident type3 
(n=125) 
Incident type4 
(n=40) 
Total 
 n % n % n % n % n 
Clinical administration 25 5.0 30 11.0 15 12.0 7 17.5 77 
Clinical process/procedure 251 50.2 165 60.7 77 61.6 22 55.0 515 
Diagnosis/assessment1 48 9.6 61 12.2 39 7.8 14 2.6 162 
Procedure/treatment/intervention 156 31.2 75 15.0 28 5.6 8 1.6 267 
Day-to-day general patient1 
healthcare and observations1 
39 7.8 22 4.4 8 1.6 0 - 69 
Documentation 5 1.0 15 5.5 12 9.6 5 12.5 37 
Healthcare-associated infection or 
complication 
83 16.6 10 3.7 2 1.6 1 2.5 96 
Sepsis1 54 10.8 5 1.0 0 - 1 0.2 60 
Medication/IV fluids 66 13.2 22 8.1 13 10.4 2 5.0 103 
Prescription1 18 3.6 9 1.8 9 1.8 1 0.2 37 
Administration1 39 7.8 9 1.8 4 0.8 0 - 52 
Blood/blood products 3 0.6 3 1.1  0 - 0  - 6 
Medical device/equipment 30 6.0 1 0.4  0 -  0 - 31 
Patient incidents 22 4.4 15 5.5 5 4.0 2 5.0 44 
Infrastructure/building/fixtures 1 0.2 8 2.9 1 0.8 1 2.5 11 
Other 1 0.2 1 0.4 0 - 0 - 2 
Not known 13 2.6 2 0.7 0 - 0 - 15 
1Only the most common Level 2 incident types are shown.  
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Table 3:  Type of Level 1 and 2 contributing factors identified as involved in the patient death 
(n=756) 
 
Contributing factor n %  
Staff factors – behavioural/human action/ individual 300 39.7 
Clinical process or procedure – error or violation 150 20.3 
Communication/miscommunication 83 11.2 
Training 22 3.0 
Experience 36 4.9 
Fatigue/ exhaustion 4 0.5 
Stress 2 0.3 
Individual factors not elsewhere classified 3 0.4 
Patients factors 194 25.7 
Physical and psychological health or impairment (pre-existing) 180 24.4 
Communication issues 9 1.2 
Patient not elsewhere classified 6 0.8 
Organisational/service factors 229 30.3 
Work practices, protocols, policies or guidelines 137 18.5 
Supervision 11 1.5 
Organisational decisions/ culture 10 1.4 
Workforce and teamwork 35 4.7 
Workload, work pressure or workflow 27 3.7 
Organisational factors not elsewhere classified 9 1.2 
Work environment factors 15 2.0 
Light 1 0.1 
Security 1 0.1 
Physical layout 2 0.3 
Remote/long distance 7 0.9 
Work environment not elsewhere classified 4 0.5 
Other factors 17 2.3 
Not known1 90 11.9 
1 Not known excluded from total count of 756 contributing factors identified. 
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Table 4: Coronial recommendations and organisational preventive actions undertaken 
 Patient deaths 
(n=500) 
 n % 
Coronial recommendations1   
No recommendations 190 - 
No recommendations as hospital already made changes 90 - 
Recommendations made regarding:   
Organisational policies/ protocols/ guidelines 138 33.2 
Organisational checklists 12 2.9 
Organisational record keeping, medical or electronic records 64 15.4 
Organisational culture 8 1.9 
Organisational supervision 23 5.5 
Equipment changes and/or design 21 5.0 
Staff training or education 84 20.2 
Recommendations not elsewhere classified 66 15.9 
Organisational preventive actions   
Organisational preventive actions1   
No preventive actions reported in the coronial findings 300 - 
Preventive actions made regarding:   
Organisational policies/ protocols/ guidelines 156 38.9 
Organisational checklists 21 5.2 
Organisational record keeping, medical or electronic records 37 9.2 
Organisational culture 8 2.0 
Organisational supervision 18 4.5 
Equipment changes and/or design 41 10.2 
Staff training or education 82 20.4 
Preventive actions not elsewhere classified 30 7.5 
Preventive actions not specified 8 2.0 
1 Up to five coronial recommendations and up to five organisational preventive actions could be indicated for 
each death. 
 
 
